Abstract. This paper introduces a new {k, n}-secret sharing scheme for color images. The proposed method encrypts the color image into n color shares. The secret information is recovered only if the k (or more) allowed shares are available for decryption. The proposed method utilizes the conventional {k, n}-secret sharing strategy by operating at the bit-levels of the decomposed color image. Modifying the spatial arrangements of the binary components, the method produces color shares with varied both the spectral characteristics among the RGB components and the spatial correlation between the neighboring color vectors. Since encryption is done in the decomposed binary domain, there is no obvious relationship in the RGB color domain between any two color shares or between the original color image and any of the n shares. This increases protection of the secret information. Inverse cryptographic processing of the shares must be realized in the decomposed binary domain and the procedure reveals the original color image with perfect reconstruction.
Introduction
Visual cryptography [2] , [3] , [4] , [8] , [11] is a popular cryptographic tool used for protection of scanned documents and natural digital images which are distributed via public networks. These techniques are based on the principle of sharing secret information among a group of participants. The shared secret can be recovered only when a coalition of willing participants are polling their encrypted images, the so-called shares, together. Secret sharing schemes are usually termed visual since the secret (original) information can be directly revealed from stacked shares (e.g realized as transparencies) through simple visual inspection, without any computer-guided processing [9] , [11] .
A {k, n}-threshold visual cryptography scheme [5] , [6] , [11] often called {k, n}-visual secret sharing (VSS), is used to encrypt an input image by splitting the original content into n, seemingly random, shares. To recover the secret information, k (or more) allowed shares must be stacked together. Due to its algorithmic nature, conventional visual cryptography schemes operate on a binary input ( Fig. 1 ) [10] . Assuming a K 1 × K 2 binary image (black and white image with 0 values denoting the black and 1 values denoting the white), each binary pixel r (i,j) determined by spatial coordinates i = 1, 2, ..., K 1 and j = 1, 2, ..., K 2 is replaced via an encryption function f e (·) with a m 1 × m 2 block of black and white pixels in each of the n shares. Repeating the process for each input pixel, a K 1 × K 2 input binary image is encrypted into n binary shares each one with a spatial resolution of m 1 K 1 × m 2 K 2 pixels. Since the spatial arrangement of the pixels varies from block to block, the original information cannot be revealed without accessing a predefined number of shares. Let as assume a basic {2, 2}-threshold structure which is the basic case designed within the {k, n}-VSS framework [1] , [7] . Assuming for simplicity a basic structure with 2 × 2 blocks
, the encryption process is defined as follows:
where C 0 and C 1 are the sets obtained by permuting the columns of the n×m 1 m 2 basis matrices A 0 and A 1 , respectively [10] . Since m 1 m 2 represents the factor by which each share is larger than the original image, it is desirable to make m 1 m 2 as small as possible. In the case of the {2, 2}-VSS the optimal choice m 1 and m 2 leads to m 1 = 2 and m 2 = 2 resulting in 2 × 2 blocks s 1 and s 2 . 
include all matrices obtained by permuting the columns of the 2×4 basis matrices A 0 and A 1 , respectively [10] , [11] . The basic matrices considered here are defined as follows:
If a secret pixel is white, i.e. r (i,j) = 1, then each pixel in s 1 is equivalent to each pixel in s 2 , and thus, [
T can be any member of set C 1 . If a secret pixel is black, i.e. r (i,j) = 0, then each pixel in s 1 should complement each pixel in s 2 and thus, [
T is guided by a random number generator, which determines the random character of the shares.
The decrypted block is produced through a decryption function f d (·). In the case of the {2, 2}-scheme based on the basis matrices of (4), f d (·) can be defined as follows: where
are 2 × 2 share blocks which are used to recover the output block
The application of a conventional {k, n}-VSS scheme to a K 1 × K 2 natural image requires halftoning [7] , [10] . The image is first transformed into a K 1 × K 2 halftone image by using the density of the net dots to simulate the intensity levels [12] . Applying the procedure for each color channel of the original image ( Fig. 2a) independently, each color channel of the halftone image (Fig. 2b) is a binary image and thus appropriate for the VSS. Assuming {2, 2}-VSS, the two color shares obtained by the procedure are depicted in Fig. 2c,d . Figure 2e shows the 2K 1 × 2K 2 decrypted image (result) obtained by stacking the two shares together.
Visual inspection of both the original image ( Fig. 1a and Fig. 2a ) and the recovered image (Fig. 1d and Fig. 2e) indicates that: i) the decrypted image is darker, and ii) the input image is of quarter size compared to the decrypted output. Moreover, the decrypted color image depicted in Fig. 2e contains a number of color artifacts due to nature of the algorithm. To end this, the conventional {k, n}-threshold visual cryptography i) cannot provide perfect reconstruction, either in terms of pixel intensity or spatial resolution, and ii) is not appropriate for real-time applications. Figure 3 shows the images obtained using the conventional {2, 2}-secret sharing scheme applied to the image with the different color scenario compared to Fig. 2 . It can be again observed that the decrypted image depicted in Fig.  3e contains shifted colors which often prohibit correct perception of fine image details.
Is has to be mentioned that the halftoning-based {k, n}-visual secret sharing schemes are the most popular choice for natural image secret sharing. Another secret sharing approach for color images is based on mean color-mixing [8] . However, this method is not appropriate for practical applications due to significant reduction of color gamut and the extreme increase in the spatial resolution of the shares. Other works, e.g. [9] , [13] deals with analytical construction of the secret sharing schemes for color images.
{k, n}-Color Secret Sharing
Red-Green-Blue (RGB) color image representing a two-dimensional matrix of the three-component color vectors (pixels) x (i,j) = [x (i,j)1 , x (i,j)2 , x (i,j)3 ] located at the spatial position (i, j), for i = 1, 2, ..., K 1 and j = 1, 2, ..., K 2 . Assuming that c describes the color channel (i.e. c = 1 for Red, c = 2 for Green, and c = 3 for Blue) and the color component x (i,j)c is coded with B bits allowing x (i,j)c to take an integer value between 0 and 2 B − 1, the color vector x (p,q) can be equivalently expressed in a binary form as follows:
3 denotes the binary vector at the b-bit level, with b = 1 denoting the most significant bits (MSB). T ∈ C 0 . This forms an encryption function defined as follows: . Thus, the process modifies both the spatial correlation between spatially neighboring binary vectors s 
Encryption
Due to random processing taking place at the bit-levels, S 1 and S 2 contain only random, color noise like information (Fig. 4b,c) . Since encryption is realized in the decomposed binary vector space, no detectable relationship between the original color vectors x (p,q) and the color noise of S 1 or S 2 can be found in the RGB color domain. This considerably increases security and prevents unauthorized decryption through brute-force enumeration.
Decryption
The decryption procedure is designed to satisfy the perfect reconstruction property. The original color data must be recovered from the color shares S 1 and S 2 using inverse algorithmic steps. Therefore, the decryption procedure is applied to the decomposed binary vector arrays of the color shares. Assuming that (9) which is used to restore the binary vectors x b (i,j) . The procedure completes with the bit-level stacking (6) resulting in the original color vector x (i,j) . Figure 4d shows the decrypted color output. Since the proposed method satisfies the perfect reconstruction property, the output image is identical to the original depicted in Fig 4a. Note that perfect reconstruction is demonstrated also in Fig 5, which depicts two full color shares (Fig 5b,c) and the decrypted output ( Fig 5d) obtained by the proposed {2, 2}-secret sharing scheme applied to the test image "Atlas" ( Fig 5a) .
It has to be mentioned that (9), which is defined for a {2, 2}-scheme, can be more generally described as follows: 
Conclusion
A {k, n} secret sharing scheme with perfect reconstruction of the color inputs was introduced. The method cryptographically processes the color images replacing the bit components with a block of bits for each of the n shares. By separate encrypting each bit plane of the decomposed color image, the method produces color shares with varied spectral and spatial characteristics. Since encryption is realized in the decomposed binary domain, the procedure increases protection against attacks performed in the RGB color domain. This makes the method attractive for secure transmission over the untrusted public channel. Moreover, the perfect reconstruction property allows to reveal the original color image without visual impairments or color shifts.
